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Abstract
　This paper presents an overview of some of the most important decisions handed 
down by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery from 
February 2016 to October 2016 in lawsuits arising out of Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A) transactions.
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I.	 Introduction:
As had been anticipated, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision on 
January 22, 2016 in In Re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation1 led to a dramatic decrease 
in disclosure-only suits arising out of M&A transactions. 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Chancery Court have 
handed down significant decisions in the period from February 2016 to October 2016 
in issues relating to M&A transactions. This paper briefly sets out the legal principles 
enunciated in some of these decisions.2
II.	 Significant	Decisions:
Following are some of the important M&A-related decisions handed down by 
the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery in the period from 
February to October 2016, in chronological order.
●　Singh v. Attenborough:3 
1 In Re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del.Ch.2016). Consolidated 
C.A. No. 10020-CB. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on 
January 22, 2016. Available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=235370.  
  The Court there had rejected a disclosure only settlement, while stating:
To be more specific, practitioners should expect that disclosure
settlements are likely to be met with continued disfavor in the
future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly
material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject 
matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to
encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary 
duty claims if the record shows that such claims have been
investigated sufficiently.
(Internal footnote omitted.)
In Re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Id., at internal page 24 of the opinion.
2 Because of space limitations, some significant decisions are not set out in this paper. 
See, for example: FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics. C.A. No. 9706-CB. Decided by 
the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on February 23, 2016. Available at: 
http://courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=237210.　
3 Singh v. Attenborough. Decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware on May 
6, 2016. Order available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=240520.
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This was a decision issued by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware 
on May 6, 2016. The case related to a merger between Zale Corporation and Signet 
Jewelers, Limited. Some stockholders of Zale Corporation had alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duties on the part of the directors in respect of the merger, and the aiding 
and abetting of those breaches by Zale’s financial advisors. 
In the first instance, on the defendants’ motion, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery concluded that the directors had committed a breach of their duty of care but 
dismissed the claims against the directors because of a 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause.4 
However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the aiding and abetting claim against 
the financial advisors.5
However, the financial advisors moved for reargument on the basis of a 
subsequently issued decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware.6 Based on that 
decision, the Court accepted the financial advisors’ contention that the appropriate 
standard of review for evaluating the directors’ conduct regarding their duty of care 
4 The relevant part of Section 102 (b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
states:
§102 Contents of certificate of incorporation
(a) ....
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the
certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section,
the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of
the following matters:
…
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability 
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided 
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)...; (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit....
5 In Re Zale Corporation Stockholders Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 9388-VCP. 
Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on October 1, 2015. 2015 
WL 5853693. Available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=230480.
6 In the case of Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
Decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware on October 2, 2015.
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should have been the Business Judgment Rule standard rather than the enhanced 
scrutiny Revlon standard which the Court had earlier applied. Applying the Business 
Judgment Rule standard, the Court held that the allegations in the complaint were not 
sufficient to show that the directors had breached their duty of care and therefore there 
could be no aiding and abetting liability on the part of the financial advisors.7 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court 
that “a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders invoked the 
business judgment rule standard of review.”8
Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court observed:
“When the business judgment rule standard of review is
invoked because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result.
That is because the vestigial waste exception has long had 
little real-world relevance, because it has been understood that
stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is
wasteful.”9 (Internal citations omitted)
The opinion of the Chancery Court and its affirmation by the Delaware 
Supreme Court sets out certain aspects of the liability of financial advisors for aiding 
and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of the board of directors.  
●　In Re: Appraisal of Dell, Inc.:10
This case arose from a 2013 going-private merger, whereby Dell, Inc. merged 
with Michael Dell-affiliated entities and a private equity firm. The merger agreement 
provided that each publicly traded share of the common stock of the company would 
be converted into a right to receive a specified amount per share in cash, with the 
holders retaining their right to seek appraisal.11 After the closing of the merger, thirteen 
7 In Re Zale Corporation Stockholders Litigation (Motion for reargument). Decided by the 
Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on October 29, 2015. Available at:
http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=231670.
8 Singh v. Attenborough, supra note 3, at internal pages 1 and 2 of the Order.
9 Singh v. Attenborough, supra note 3, at internal pages 2 and 3 of the Order.
10In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
on May 11, 2016, 143 A.3d 20 (Del.Ch.2016).　
11 Appraisal rights are provided for in §262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
155BULLETIN OF KYUSHU WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY     Vol.53 No.2
appraisal petitions were filed by former shareholders. The litigation involved two 
different issues. One related to the question of entitlement to appraisal. The other 
related to the core question of fair value. The present ruling, delivered post-trial by 
the Court of Chancery on May 11, 2016, related to the question of the right to seek 
appraisal by a certain specified block of appraisal petitioners. (referred to in the Court’s 
opinion as “T. Rowe Petitioners”) who had directed the holder of record of their shares 
to vote against the merger. However, due to a convoluted series of circumstances, the 
shares had been inadvertently voted in favor of the merger. The Court held that this 
block of appraisal petitioners (“T. Rowe Petitioners”) were not entitled to appraisal as 
they did not satisfy the requirement of §262 (a) of the Delaware General Corporate 
Law that fair value appraisal petitioners should have “neither voted in favor of the 
merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this 
title....” The precedents on this issue might have suggested a contrary conclusion. The 
Court, however, distinguished the precedents principally on the basis that unlike in the 
precedents, the evidence in this case showed that the specified block of petitioners’ 
shares had in fact been voted in favor of the merger.
  Subsections (a) and (h) of §262, in relevant part, state: 
(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds
shares of stock on the date of the making of a demand pursuant
to subsection (d) of this section with respect to such shares,
who continuously holds such shares through the effective date
of the merger or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with 
subsection (d) of this section and who has neither voted
in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented 
thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall
be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of
the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock under
the circumstances described in subsections (b) and (c)
of this section....
…
(h) After the Court determines the stockholders entitled 
to an appraisal, the appraisal proceeding shall be conducted
in accordance with the rules of the Court of Chancery, 
including any rules specifically governing the appraisal 
proceedings. Through such proceeding the Court shall 
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to 
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors....　
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●　In Re Chelsea Therapeutics International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation:12
This case was a class action lawsuit instituted by the stockholders of a 
corporation that was sold through a tender offer and a short-form merger, The Plaintiffs 
alleged that the directors had committed breaches of their duty of loyalty by selling 
the company at a price below its actual value. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the deal 
from closing but were unable to get a preliminary injunction. Thereupon, the plaintiffs 
sought post-closing damages. Upon defendants’ motion, the Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims. The Court noted that the duty of loyalty had two aspects. One aspect 
encompassed, inter alia, the requirement that “action must be in the interest of the 
corporation and its owners, the stockholders; the duty prohibits actions for the benefit 
of the director herself, or others to whom she is beholden, absent entire fairness to the 
corporation.”13  Another aspect of the duty of loyalty, the Court postulated, was “that 
disinterested, independent directors act in good faith.”14 This required the directors 
to act only for the corporate weal and that they do not deliberately avoid performing 
their duty. However – the Court noted – bad faith could also be intuited when “even 
though there is no indication of conflicted interests or lack of independence on the 
part of the directors, the nature of their action can in no way be understood as in the 
corporate interest: res ipsa loquitar.”15 The Court characterized this component of good 
faith as “a rara avis.”16 The plaintiffs based their case on the theory that the defendants 
had acted in bad faith.17 The Court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a case 
12 In Re Chelsea Therapeutics International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation. Consol. C.A. No. 
9640-VCG. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on May 20, 
2016. Memorandum Opinion available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=241140.
13 Id., at internal page 1 of the opinion.
14 Id., at internal page 1 of the opinion.　
15 Id., at internal pages 1 and 2 of the opinion.
16 Id., at internal page 2 of the opinion.
17  In addressing the bad faith claim, the Court noted:
As this Court explained in Dent v. Ramtron International
Corp., to state a bad-faith claim, a plaintiff must show
Either “an ‘extreme set of facts’” to establish that 
“‘disinterested directors were intentionally disregarding
duties,’” or that “the decision under attack is so far
beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it
seems inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”
(Internal citations omitted)
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showing that the defendants had acted in bad faith, and on that footing, dismissed the 
complaint.
        
●　In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc.:18
This case related to the appraisal of fair value of the shares relating to the 
previously mentioned Dell merger. The petitioners were stockholders of Dell, Inc. at 
the time of its merger. They had opposed merger and therefore were entitled to an 
appraisal of the fair value of their shares at the time of the merger. At the meeting held 
to approve the deal, holders of 57 % of the outstanding shares  voted to approve the 
merger. 
In its legal analysis of the fair value in the case, the Court noted that under the 
terms of Section 262 (h) of the DGCL, it is the Court that is required to determine the 
fair value of the shares.19 The Court cited numerous Delaware precedents which set out 
the basic principles regarding the appraisal of fair value.20 
In Re Chelsea Therapeutics International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation 
Id, at internal page 16 of the opinion.
18 In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc. C.A. No.9322-VCL. Decided by the Court of Chancery of 
the State of Delaware on May 31,2016. Memorandum Opinion available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=241590.
19 Id., at internal page 41 of the opinion.
20 The Court quoted at length the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Tri-Continental 
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,72 (Del. 1950), regarding value. The passage quoted by 
the Delaware Court of Chancery reads:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that
the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been
taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going 
concern. By value of the stockholder’s proportionate interest
is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been
taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents
the true or intrinsic value....the courts must take into
consideration all factors and elements which reasonably
might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value,
asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which
could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which
throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation
are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the
dissenting stockholder’s interest, but must be considered....
(Internal citations omitted)
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Citing a plethora of considerations, the Court of Chancery rejected the 
company’s contention that the final merger price was the best evidence of fair value.21 
A few of the factors that weighed with the Court were the following: The present case 
The passage above is quoted in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s Opinion, supra 
note 18, at internal page 45.
21 The Delaware Court of Chancery also extensively quoted the opinion of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP (Golden Telecom II) 11 
A.3d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010) (footnotes omitted). The passage quoted states:
             Section 262 (h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that
             the Court of Chancery should consider the transactional
             market price of the underlying company. Rather, in
             determining “fair value,” the statute instructs that the
             court “shall take into account all relevant factors.”
             Importantly, this Court has defined “fair value” as the
             value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as
             opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an acquisition
             or other transaction. Determining “fair value” through “all
             relevant factors” may be an imperfect process, but the 
             General Assembly has determined it to be an appropriately
             fair process....
             Section 262 (h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of 
             Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of 
             “fair value” at the time of the transaction. It vests the
             Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant 
             discretion to consider “all relevant factors” and determine
             the going concern value of the underlying company.
             Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer – conclusively
             or presumptively – to the merger price, even in the face of
             a pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would
             contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and
             the reasoned holdings of our precedent. It would
             inappropriately shift the responsibility to determine 
             “fair value” from the court to the private parties. Also,
             While it is difficult for the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors
             to assess wildly divergent expert opinions regarding value,
             inflexible rules governing appraisal provide little additional
             benefit in determining “fair value” because of the already
             high costs of appraisal actions….Therefore, we reject…
             [the] call to establish a rule requiring the Court of 
             Chancery to defer to the merger price in any appraisal 
             proceeding.
(The passage above is quoted in the Court’s Opinion, supra note 18 at internal pages 
48-49.)
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was a management buyout and hence to be distinguished from a typical arm’s length 
transaction because of the information differential between the two; the active bidders 
were financial buyers who use LBO model because of their IRR requirements, rather 
than strategic buyers; the evidence suggested a wide gap between the market price of 
the company and its real value; and the unique value of the founder Michael Dell to 
the company and the fact that he was part of the buyout group. 
The Court considered the sale process to have been flawed, causing various 
anomalies that resulted in mispricing. On that basis, the Court ruled that the merger 
consideration did not constitute the fair value of the company. Using a Discounted 
Cash Flow analysis, the Court concluded that the fair value of the company at the 
closing date of the merger was $ 17.62 per share, which was $ 3.87 higher than the 
merger consideration price of $ 13.75 per share.22    
●　In Re Volcano Corporation Stockholder Litigation:23
This was an action instituted by the former stockholders of an acquired 
corporation against the directors and the financial advisor of the corporation alleging 
breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of the directors and aiding and abetting of 
those breaches on the part of the financial advisor. The defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss, invoking Rule 12(b)(6) of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Upon a 
consideration of the facts, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. In doing 
so, the Court applied the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Corwin v. KKR Financial 
22 In a follow-up motion regarding the attorneys’ fees of the claimants, the Chancery 
Court relied upon the factors spelled out in Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, 420 
A.2d 142 (Del. 1980), as summarized by the Delaware Supreme Court in Ams.Mining 
Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1254 (Del.2012). Quoting the Supreme Court, the 
Court noted that the factors were: “1) the results achieved; 2) the time and effort 
of counsel; 3) the relative complexities of the litigation; 4) any contingency factor; 
and 5) the standing and ability of counsel involved.” In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc. 
Consolidated C.A.No.9322-VCL. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of 
Delaware on October 17, 2016. Memorandum Opinion available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=247530. The passage quoted 
above is at internal page 26 of the Opinion. In the light of the factors cited, the Court 
ruled that the fees sought by the attorneys were reasonable.
23 In Re Volcano Corporation Stockholder Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 10485-VCMR. 
Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on June 30, 2016. 
Available at: http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=243120.
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Holdings, LLC24 to a two-step merger under DGCL §251 which was undertaken 
in the present case. The Court’s ruling, inter alia, sets out the following: “1. The 
fully informed, uncoerced, disinterested approval of a merger by a corporation’
s outstanding shares pursuant to a statutorily required vote renders the business 
judgment rule irrebuttable”;25 “2. Stockholder acceptance of a tender offer pursuant 
to a Section 251(h) merger has the same cleansing effect as a stockholder vote in 
favor of a transaction”;26 “3. Volcano’s stockholders were full informed, disinterested, 
and uncoerced.”27 The Court held that the merger could only be challenged on the 
grounds of waste which the plaintiffs had not pled. On that basis, the Court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.
●　In Re Appraisal of DFC Global Corporation:28
In this case, the petitioners were former stockholders of a corporation that was 
sold to a private equity buyer. The petitioners sought the Court’s appraisal of the fair 
value of their shares held by them, contending that the sale price was lower than its 
fair value due to a temporary period of uncertainty. In calculating the fair value, the 
petitioner’s expert used a discounted cash flow model relying on the projections issued 
by the management. The respondent’s expert used a combination of a discounted cash 
flow model and a multiples-based comparable companies analysis. The Court rejected 
the transaction price as the fair value, stating:
Although this Court frequently defers to a transaction 
price that was the product of an arm’s-length process and 
a robust bidding environment, that price is reliable only 
when the market conditions leading to the
24 Supra note 6.
25 In Re Volcano Corporation Stockholder Litigation, supra note 23, at internal page 22 of 
the opinion. The detailed discussion of this point runs from internal pages 22 to 28 of 
the opinion.
26 Id., at internal page 28 of the opinion. The detailed discussion of this point runs from 
internal pages 28 to 41 of the opinion.
27 Id., at internal page 41 of the opinion. The detailed discussion of this point runs from 
internal pages 41 to 47 of the opinion.
28 In Re Appraisal of DFC Global Corporation. Consolidated C.A.No.10107-CB. Decided 
by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on July 8, 2016. Memorandum 
Opinion available at: http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=243400.
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 transaction are conducive to achieving a fair price.
 Similarly, a discounted cash flow model is only as 
reliable as the financial projections used in it 
and other underlying assumptions. The transaction 
here was negotiated during a period of significant 
company turmoil and regulatory uncertainty, 
calling into question the reliability of the transaction 
price as well as management’s financial projections. 
Thus, neither of these proposed metrics to value 
DFC stands out as being inherently more reliable
than the other.29 
                        
The Court conducted its own valuation analysis using a combination of a 
discounted cash flow model appropriately adapted to suit the facts of the case, a 
comparable company analysis, and the transaction price and arrived at a fair value 
that was somewhere between the figures proffered by the petitioners’ and respondents’ 
experts. 
●　In Re Riverstone National, Inc. Stockholder Litigation:30
This case was filed by the minority stockholders of a corporation, inter alia, 
challenging the fairness of the corporation’s merger on the ground that the majority 
of directors had committed a breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the board of directors caused the merger to happen, whereby one of 
the merger terms had the effect of preemptively staving off a potential impending 
derivative lawsuit against the directors by the stockholders for breach of fiduciary 
duty on the ground of usurpation of corporate opportunity. Under the terms of the 
merger agreement, the acquirer waived the right to pursue the cause of action against 
the directors. The plaintiffs claimed that this chose-in-action was a corporate asset, 
the abandonment of which was not adequately compensated for by the merger price, 
29 Id., at internal pages 1 and 2 of the opinion.
30 In Re Riverstone National, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 9796-
VCG. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on July 28, 2016. 
Memorandum Opinion available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=244240.
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thereby resulting in unfairness to the minority shareholders.  The defendant directors 
filed motions to dismiss on the ground that their actions were to be evaluated on 
the basis of the business judgment rule. The court noted that the applicability of the 
business judgment rule was a rebuttable presumption, and that the facts pled in the 
complaint in this case were adequate to overcome the presumption. Specifically, the 
Court stated:
[T]he Plaintiffs plead particularized facts with respect 
to individual directors showing the existence of a 
chose-in-action against the directors which, if brought
 as a claim would have survived a motion to 
dismiss; that the director at the time of 
negotiating and recommending the merger was aware
of the potential action; that the potential for liability 
was material to the director; and that the directors 
obtained and recommended an agreement that 
extinguished the claim directly by contract. Where, 
as here, such a pleading is made with respect to a
majority of the directors, the complaint is sufficient 
to rebut the business judgment rule.31 
The business judgment rule having been rebutted, the Court found that “entire 
fairness” was the appropriate standard of review in the present case for evaluating the 
plaintiffs’ allegation of usurpation of corporate opportunity by the defendant directors.32 
In addition to the applicability of the entire fairness standard, the Court also concluded 
31 Id., at internal page 22 of the opinion.
32 With reference to the usurpation of corporate opportunity, the Court noted that the 
germane factors identified by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Broz v. Cellular Info.
Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del.1996), were: 
“ (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; 
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity;
and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate
fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his
duties to the corporation.”
(Supra note 30, at internal page 23 of the opinion.)
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that the facts pled in the complaint indicated that the merger was unfair and that the 
plaintiffs’ claim regarding the defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty 
survived the motions to dismiss.  
  
●　City of Miami General Employees v. Comstock:33  
This case involved a stockholder challenge to a merger on the ground of 
breaches of fiduciary duty. Upon plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction, 
the Chancery Court enjoined the closing of the merger until the target company had 
solicited alternative bids within a 30-day period. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed the order of injunction. Thereupon, the closing of the merger was 
completed with a majority vote of the target company’s stockholders. The plaintiff 
made a post-closing amendment of its complaint seeking damages for breaches of 
fiduciary duties on the part of certain officers of the target company along with an 
aiding and abetting claim against others. The defendants moved the Chancery Court 
seeking a dismissal of the amended complaint and recovery of damages.  
The Court rejected the various allegations put forward by the plaintiff 
regarding the sale process and the proxy disclosures. The Court also noted the situation 
resulting from the Supreme Court’s reversal of the preliminary injunction. Finding 
that this case involved a non-controller transaction and that it had been approved by 
a majority of fully informed stockholders, the Court declined to use the entire fairness 
review standard as urged by the plaintiff and instead applied the deferential business 
judgment standard as required by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. 
KKR Financial Holdings LLC.34 Applying the business judgment standard of review, the 
Chancery Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court also granted the 
plaintiff’s motion for damages.    
33 City of Miami General Employees’ Retirement Trust v. Jerry M. Comstock and others. C.A. 
No. 9980-CB. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on August 
24, 2016. Available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=245350.
34 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings., 125 A.3d 304.  Decided by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Delaware on October 2, 2015. Available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=230530.
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●　Larkin v. Shah:35 
In this case, former stockholders of an acquired corporation (Auspex) brought 
suit challenging the merger and seeking post-closing damages, on the grounds that 
the directors had committed breaches of their fiduciary duties in allowing a flawed 
sales process whereby the stockholders were denied suitable consideration for the 
shares they held. The plaintiffs alleged that a controlling stockholder seeking personal 
benefit had influenced the board into approving the merger to the detriment of the 
other stockholders, or in the alternative, that the majority of board members had actual 
conflicts of interest during the sale process. For this reason, the plaintiff urged the 
Court to apply the entire fairness standard of review. The defendants moved the Court 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint contending, inter alia, that the business judgment 
standard of review applied. The Court accepted the defendants’ argument and granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. In considering the facts of the case, 
the Court’s opinion states:
[A]nalysis of the applicable standard of review 
follows three analytical markers: (1) when 
disinterested, fully informed, uncoerced stockholders
approve a transaction absent a looming conflicted 
controller, the irrebuttable business judgment rule
applies; (2) there was no looming conflicted controller
in this case; (3) the challenged merger was properly
approved by disinterested, uncoerced Auspex stockholders.36 
After a detailed examination of the pled facts in the light of applicable 
precedents, the Court concluded that the deferential business judgment standard of 
review, rather than the exacting entire fairness standard, was applicable in the present 
case. The Court noted that a claim for waste could defeat the application of the 
35 Larkin and another v. Shah and others. C.A. No.10918-VCS. Decided by the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware on August 25, 2016. Available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=245400.
36 Larkin v. Shah, id., at internal page 21 of the Opinion. (In a footnote to the passage 
quoted above, the Opinion explains that “proper stockholder approval” refers “to an 
uncoerced, fully informed vote or tender of a majority of outstanding shares owned 
by disinterested stockholders.”)
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business judgment rule, but the plaintiffs in the present claim had made no such claim. 
In the event, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The Court also denied the 
plaintiffs’ request to amend the complaint.
●　An Nguyen v. Michael G. Barrett:37
In this case, the stockholder of a corporation brought a class action challenging 
the corporation’s merger agreement on the grounds of breaches of fiduciary duty by the 
directors and the aiding and abetting of those breaches by another, and on the ground 
of violations of disclosure requirements. Before the closing of the merger, the plaintiff 
moved the court for expedition of the proceedings and for a preliminary injunction 
urging only one of the disclosure violations. The Court denied  injunctive relief. The 
plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal before the Delaware Supreme Court which, too, 
was denied. Thereupon, the merger transaction closed with a large majority of the 
corporation’s shares being tendered. In the post-closing action, the plaintiff amended 
his complaint and sought damages alleging two disclosure violations, one of which 
was the same as that urged in support of the preliminary injunction. Upon defendants’ 
motion, the Court dismissed the amended complaint. In its ruling, the Court made a 
distinction between a pre-close and a post-close disclosure claim. The Opinion states:
In order to sustain a pre-close disclosure claim, heard
on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff
must demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood of proving
that the alleged omission or misrepresentation is material;
by contrast, when asserting a disclosure claim for 
for damages against directors post-close, a plaintiff
must allege facts making it reasonably conceivable that
there has been a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty
by the board in failing to make a material disclosure.
....
Where, as here, an exculpation provision under
37 An Nguyen v. Michael G. Barrett. C.A. No. 11511-VCG. Decided by the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware on September 28, 2016. Memorandum Opinion 
available at: http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=246500.
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8 Del.C.§102(b)(7) shields a board from duty-of-care
Claims, this means a plaintiff must demonstrate that
a majority of the board was not disinterested or
independent, or that the board was otherwise disloyal
because it failed to act in good faith, in failing to make 
the material disclosure. A showing of bad faith requires
an “extreme set of facts to establish that disinterested
directors were intentionally disregarding their duties
or that the decision...[was] so far beyond the
bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than
bad faith.”38 
(Internal citations omitted)
                           
On the basis of the facts pled in the complaint, the Court held that the exacting 
standards of a post-close disclosure claim had not been met, and on that footing 
dismissed the amended complaint. 
●　In Re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation:39
In this case, the controlling stockholders of a corporation took it private 
through a squeeze-out merger, whereby the minority stockholders were given the 
right to receive a specified amount per share that they held, subject to their right to 
appraisal of fair value. The minority stockholders challenged the merger and made 
a post-closing claim for damages contending breaches of fiduciary duties on the part 
of the controlling stockholders, the directors, and certain officers, and the aiding and 
abetting of such breaches by others. The plaintiffs made their claim on the basis 
that the offered price per share was lower than another offer that the controlling 
stockholders did not want to accept. Upon defendants’ motion, the Court dismissed 
38 An Nguyen v. Michael G. Barrett, id., at internal pages 7 and 8 of the opinion (internal 
citations omitted).
39 In Re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 11343-VCL. 
Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on October 10, 2016. 
Memorandum Opinion available at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=247090.
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the complaint because the merger transaction had comported with the framework set 
out by the Delaware Supreme Court in respect of controlling-stockholder mergers in 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation.40 Due to this compliance, the Court held that the 
deferential business judgment standard of review applied. The Court further explained: 
“Under that standard of review, the court will defer to the judgments made by the 
corporation’s fiduciaries unless the Merger is so extreme as to suggest waste.”41 As the 
merger in the present case did not constitute waste, the complaint was dismissed. 
40 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). The framework as set out by 
the Delaware Supreme Court and quoted in the Court’s opinion is:
              (i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval
              of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority
              stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent;
              (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select
              its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the
              Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating
              a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and 
              (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.” 
              
In Re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation supra note 39, at internal 
page 16 of the Opinion.
41 In Re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, supra note 39, at internal page 1 of 
the Opinion. Quoting from precedents, the Court further stated at internal page 41 of 
the Opinion:
              “Once the elements of M&F Worldwide are met, the business
              judgment rule provides the operative standard of review. 
              “Under that rule, the court is precluded from inquiring
              into the substantive fairness of the merger, and must
              dismiss the challenge to the merger unless the merger’s
              terms were so disparate that no rational person acting in
              good faith could have thought the merger was fair to the
              minority.” MFW, 67 A.3d 496 at 500. “[It is] logically 
              difficult to conceptualize how a plaintiff can ultimately
              prove a waste or gift claim in the face of a decision by
              fully informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders to
              ratify the transaction.” Huizenga, 751 A.2d at 901. By
              definition, at that point, rational people who were
              members of the minority thought the merger was fair.” 
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III.	 Conclusion:
The preceding overview provides a brief conspectus of the evolving 
jurisprudence of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery 
in issues relating to Merger and Acquisition transactions, serving to reinforce their 
reputation as the leading Courts in the United States in respect of matters relating to 
corporate law.     
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合併と買収（M＆A）訴訟における近年の進展
ダタール　ニティン
九州女子大学共通教育機構　北九州市八幡西区自由ヶ丘1-1（〒807-8586）
（2016年11月10日受付、2016年12月8日受理）
要　約
　この論文では、2016年2月から2016年10月まで合併と買収（M＆A）訴訟において、デ
ラウエア最高裁判所とデラウエア大法官府裁判所（Delaware Court of Chancery）が下し
た最も重要な判決のいくつかを概観している。
